Most dark web monitoring tells you an old password appeared in an old dump. The credentials that matter were taken this week by malware on somebody’s laptop, and they came with the session cookies.
Continuous monitoring of criminal forums, marketplaces, Telegram channels and infostealer logs for your domains, your people and your brand — with our SOC acting on what turns up.
Credentials reach criminals by two routes. The slow one is a breach: a company is compromised, a database is dumped, and it circulates for years. That is what most monitoring services check, and by the time you hear about it the password has usually been changed twice.
The fast one is infostealer malware. Somebody installs a cracked application or a fake browser update, usually on a personal machine, and everything the browser holds is sent to a criminal server within minutes — saved passwords, autofill, and the session cookies that keep them logged in. Those logs are bought and used in days, not years. That is the half worth watching, and it is the half we are built around.
"Dark web monitoring" covers three very different activities, and the cheap version is the one with the least to say about your actual risk.
Your domain checked against dumps from past breaches. Cheap, widely sold, and usually what a free tool means. It tells you about passwords that were changed years ago.
Useful once, at onboarding. Not a monitoring service.
Credentials and live session cookies exfiltrated by malware in the last days or weeks — frequently from a personal device your controls never touched. This is what is actually being used to get in.
What we build the service around.
Data-for-sale posts, initial access broker listings, ransomware leak sites, phishing domains and the actors behind them. The early signal that somebody has taken an interest in you or in your sector.
Early warning, and often the most uncomfortable.
If a service cannot tell you which of these three it does, it is the first one. Ask before you buy — and ask what happens after a hit, because that is the part that decides whether any of it was worth paying for.
Finding a leaked credential is close to trivial. Deciding what it means at two in the morning, and doing something about it before it is used, is the work.
The standard product emails a PDF to a shared mailbox. Someone reads it on Monday. It lists an address and a password, and nobody knows whether the password is current, whether the account has MFA, whether the session is still live, or whether anyone has already signed in with it. So it gets forwarded to IT, and the honest answer is that most of the time nothing happens.
A hit reaches analysts who already watch your estate. They can see whether that account signed in from somewhere it should not have, whether the token was used, and what it touched. The password gets reset, the sessions get revoked, and the question of whether it was used is answered rather than left open — which is the only version of this that changes your risk rather than your mood.
If you already have monitoring and nobody acts on it, the gap is not the feed. Bring the feed and we will run the response half.
Set up in a day, then it sits in the background until it has something worth telling you — which, on the first run, it usually does.
Domains, brands, executive names, key suppliers and the applications that matter. No agents, no access to your estate, nothing to deploy.
A baseline across everything already circulating. This is the uncomfortable one — most organisations have exposure they did not know about, and some of it is still live.
New infostealer logs, forum posts, broker listings, leak sites and lookalike domains checked against your assets as they appear.
A hit is verified and assessed against your estate first, so what reaches you is a finding with a recommendation, not a raw record.
Reset, revoke, and check whether it was used. Where we run your detection and response, that happens without waiting for a ticket to be picked up.
Continuous searching of criminal forums, marketplaces, Telegram channels and malware exfiltration logs for your credentials, domains and brand. The useful version watches what is being stolen now, not only what leaked years ago.
Monitoring of your domains, people and brand, verification of anything found, and the response that follows — password reset, session revocation and a check of whether it was already used. A service that only emails you a list is a feed, not a service.
It is worth it if somebody acts on the findings. On its own a feed produces alerts nobody closes. Attached to a SOC it closes a genuine route in, because stolen session cookies bypass multi-factor authentication entirely.
A free checker tells you an address appeared in a historic breach. That password has usually been changed. We focus on infostealer logs — credentials and live session cookies taken in the last days, often from personal devices your controls never see.
It is the most common source of a live credential. Infostealers land on home machines through cracked software and fake updates, then take everything the browser saved — including sessions for your corporate applications. You cannot manage those devices, which is exactly why you want to know.
Not on its own. A stolen session cookie is an already-authenticated session, so it does not prompt for a second factor. That is why the response includes revoking sessions rather than only resetting the password.
It is verified, assessed against your estate, and brought to you with a recommendation. Where we run your detection and response we reset, revoke and check for prior use directly. Where we do not, you get everything needed to do it quickly.
Yes. Named individuals are monitored for credential exposure and for impersonation — look-alike domains and fraudulent profiles set up in their name. Senior people are targeted personally and often use personal devices for work, which is where the exposure usually appears.
Yes, and it is worth doing. A supplier with your data and stolen credentials is your incident in practice, whatever the contract says. It sits naturally alongside third-party risk management, where the same suppliers are already being assessed.
No. Monitoring runs entirely outside your estate against assets you nominate, so there is nothing to deploy and no access required. It works alongside whatever else you run.
Onboarding starts with a baseline across everything already circulating against your domains, your people and your suppliers. Most organisations find something, and some of it is still usable today.
