24/7 monitoring for the estate
that cannot go down.
A managed OT and IoT security operations centre: continuous detection, investigation and response, delivered passively and agentlessly so nothing we run can interrupt what you run.
What is a managed OT/IoT SOC?
A managed OT/IoT SOC is an outsourced security operations centre that monitors operational technology and connected devices around the clock — industrial control systems, SCADA, building management and IoT estates — rather than only the corporate IT network. Monitoring is passive and agentless so production is never interrupted, detection is tuned to industrial protocols rather than generic IT signatures, and investigation and response are carried by analysts with genuine OT and ICS experience.
Eight things, running
from the day it goes live.
This is a service rather than a product. There is no console for you to staff and no queue for you to watch.
24x7x365 detection and response
Continuous monitoring by a manned SOC, not an alerting tool with an out-of-hours voicemail. Coverage does not thin out at night or over a shutdown weekend, which is when change windows and contractor access actually happen.
Passive, agentless architecture
Nothing is installed on a controller and nothing is scanned. The monitoring observes a copy of your network traffic, so there is no route by which it can alter process timing or take a system offline.
OT and IoT-aware detection
Detection content is tuned to industrial protocols and normal operational behaviour. Generic IT signatures applied to operational traffic produce noise, and noise in an OT SOC is not a nuisance — it is the thing that gets monitoring switched off.
Specialist-led incident response
Investigations are worked by analysts with genuine OT and ICS expertise rather than IT generalists. The difference is knowing whether a PLC command is legitimate, which no amount of tooling substitutes for.
Asset discovery and live inventory
Continuous discovery builds and maintains an inventory of what is actually on the network. In most estates the register and reality parted company years ago, and you cannot protect equipment nobody has recorded.
OT-specific threat intelligence
Intelligence focused on ICS environments and the groups that target them, rather than a general commercial feed with a handful of industrial indicators appended to it.
Correlated alerting and SOAR response
Related signals are joined into a single investigation, and response actions run through orchestration with the guardrails your environment allows. What is automated and what waits for a human is your decision, per action.
Executive and compliance reporting
Reporting built to produce the evidence an assessor asks for against IEC 62443 and NIS2, alongside a board-level view that does not require translating a SIEM export.
Segmentation-aware,
because your network is.
The Purdue Model is the reference architecture for monitoring, not an afterthought applied once the sensors are already in.
Most OT networks are layered deliberately: enterprise IT at the top, control systems in the middle, field devices at the bottom, with the boundaries between them doing real security work. A monitoring design that ignores those layers has to bridge them to function, and quietly undoes the segmentation you were assessed on.
Monitoring is designed around the layers instead. Sensors sit where the architecture says they should, visibility is built at each level, and the detection understands that traffic which is normal at one layer is not necessarily normal at another. The segmentation stays intact.
That last point is where generic tooling fails hardest. An engineering workstation reaching a PLC is routine at the control layer and alarming from the enterprise network, and a tool that cannot tell the two apart either floods you with alerts about normal operations or is tuned until it ignores the one that matters. Detection built against the model knows which side of a boundary a conversation started on, and treats it accordingly.
It also changes what an investigation can conclude. When something fires at the control layer we can say whether the traffic originated there or arrived from IT, which is usually the difference between a maintenance window nobody logged and an intrusion worth waking somebody for.
Enterprise
Corporate network, identity, cloud, ERP and business planning.
- Domain
- Cloud
- ERP
Industrial DMZ
The boundary between the business network and the plant.
- Jump hosts
- Data diode
- Proxy
Site operations
Historians, engineering workstations, domain services and reporting.
- Historian
- EWS
- MES
Supervisory control
SCADA and the HMIs an operator actually watches.
- SCADA
- HMI
Basic control
PLCs and RTUs issuing the commands that move things.
- PLC
- RTU
- DCS
Process
Sensors, actuators and the physical equipment itself.
- Sensors
- Actuators
The sensor is not
the service.
We monitor the platform you already have. If you do not have one yet, the assessment comes first and the purchase second.
Every OT platform on this page does broadly the same job: it sits passively on the network, works out what is there, and reports what it sees. They differ in protocol depth, in how they present an estate and in what they cost, and those differences matter — but far less than what happens to the output.
What makes monitoring useful is the security work downstream of the sensor: knowing which of ten thousand observations is worth an investigation, and what to do about it at two in the morning on a running plant. That expertise is ours rather than any vendor's, and it transfers across all of them. It is also the reason we have no incentive to tell you your existing platform is the problem.
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Armis
Agentless asset intelligence across unmanaged, IoT and medical device estates.
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Claroty
ICS asset discovery and vulnerability context across industrial networks.
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Forescout
Device visibility and control across mixed IT, OT and IoT environments.
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Microsoft Defender for IoT
Agentless OT, ICS and IoT monitoring with native Microsoft Sentinel integration.
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Nozomi Networks
OT and IoT network monitoring with deep industrial protocol analysis.
We would point you at Nozomi Networks or Microsoft Defender for IoT, because that is where our own detection content is most developed and where a new deployment reaches useful coverage fastest. If you already run something else, that is not a problem and not a conversation we will keep reopening.
Whichever sensor you run, its output is correlated in Microsoft Sentinel alongside your identity, endpoint and cloud signals, and worked by the same SOC. We have been running Sentinel in production since 2019, and that is the part of the stack we do have a firm opinion about.
Microsoft Defender for IoT
Microsoft Sentinel
Nozomi Networks
Most attacks reach OT
through IT.
Which is why running two monitoring operations and hoping they compare notes is the wrong shape for this problem.
The route is well worn. A phished credential on the corporate domain, a jump host somebody left dual-homed, a vendor remote-access tool scoped for one supplier three years ago and never revoked. None of that is an OT incident at the point it starts. It becomes one several steps later, by which time the two halves of the story sit in two different systems owned by two different teams.
Split the monitoring across an IT provider and an OT provider and neither sees the whole chain. Each holds a partial view, each closes its own half as unremarkable, and the handover between them is a meeting rather than a query. The attacker is not doing anything clever at that point; the visibility gap is simply where the seam was drawn.
- One managed service across both estates, so there is no silo for an attack to cross undetected and no argument about whose alert it was.
- Correlated detection that identifies lateral movement between domains as a single chain of events rather than two unrelated alerts in two consoles.
- Unified incident response aligned to operational risk, so the question asked first is what this does to the process, not what it does to the data.
- Co-managed options where you already have an internal team, with the split of responsibilities agreed rather than assumed.
Seven sectors,
seven different problems.
The technology overlaps. The regulatory position, the risk appetite and the language do not.
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Energy and utilities
Generation, transmission, distribution and water treatment.
Almost always in scope for NIS2 or the UK CAF, with regulators who want evidence rather than assurances, and assets spread across sites that have no permanent IT presence.
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Manufacturing and industrial
Production lines, SCADA, robotics and factory automation.
Downtime has a number attached to it per hour, which makes the case for passive monitoring straightforward and the case for anything intrusive impossible. Usually multi-site, with build standards that differ plant to plant.
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Critical national infrastructure
CNI-designated operators and their supply chains.
The highest regulatory bar and the most sensitive reporting obligations. The requirement increasingly lands on suppliers too, so organisations often discover they are in scope through a customer contract rather than a regulator.
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Building management
BMS, HVAC, access control and smart facilities.
Procured by facilities rather than IT, commonly installed by a contractor holding a remote-access account nobody in security knows about, and reachable from a network that has never been audited.
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Healthcare
Networked medical devices, imaging systems and infusion pumps.
Devices are regulated as medical equipment, which constrains what can be patched and by whom. Availability here is a clinical safety question, not only an operational one.
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Transport and logistics
Rail, ports, aviation and warehouse automation.
Highly automated, tightly scheduled, and dependent on systems from several operators meeting at a physical handover point. A stoppage propagates outward faster than in most estates.
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Oil, gas and chemicals
Upstream, midstream and downstream operational technology.
Safety-instrumented systems mean a control with any path to process interference is not merely unwelcome, it is a safety case problem. Remote and offshore sites add real connectivity constraints.
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Not on this list?
Most OT estates do not fit a sector label neatly.
Tell us what you run and where it sits on the network. If we cannot monitor it well we will say so, which is cheaper for both of us than finding out during deployment.
Start a conversation
Scoped first,
live within weeks.
Nothing is deployed before the architecture and the response playbooks are agreed with you in writing.
-
01
Scoping and discovery
We map the OT and IoT estate as it actually is, including the parts that are not in the asset register, and establish what normal looks like before anything is proposed.
-
02
Agree the monitoring architecture
Where sensors sit, what they see, what they touch and what they cannot touch. Signed off by you before deployment, against your segmentation rather than around it.
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03
Define the response playbooks
What happens on each class of alert, what is automated, what waits for a human, and who gets called at 3am. In OT the answer to that last question is rarely the same as in IT.
-
04
Go live and tune
Active monitoring typically begins within a few weeks of engagement start, depending on how complex the environment is and how many sites are in scope.
Further reading
on operational technology.
How A Managed IoT SOC Works: Detection, Triage, And Response Explained
Learn how a managed IoT SOC provides 24/7 detection, specialist triage and operationally aware response for IoT environments.
Internet of ThingsPassive Vs. Active IoT Monitoring: Why Non-Intrusive Matters In Operational Environments
Learn why passive IoT monitoring provides non-intrusive security visibility for OT environments without disrupting critical operations.
AI Driven Security OperationsMicrosoft Copilot For Security: What It Is And How It Fits Into The AI SOC
Learn how Microsoft Copilot for Security helps SOC analysts investigate threats faster with AI-powered guidance and automation.
Internet of ThingsWhat Is IoT Security Monitoring And Why Does 24/7 Coverage Matter?
Learn why IoT security monitoring and 24/7 visibility are essential for detecting threats and protecting connected devices.
AI Driven Security OperationsSOC Metrics That Matter In The Age Of AI: MTTD, MTTR, And How AI Is Improving Them
Understand key SOC metrics like MTTD and MTTR, and how AI reduces detection and response times while improving efficiency.
Internet of ThingsLateral Movement In IoT Environments: How Attackers Pivot From IT To OT
How attackers use lateral movement to pivot from IT into IoT and OT environments, and why this threat is so difficult to detect.
Managed OT/IoT SOC, answered.
What is a managed OT/IoT SOC?
A managed OT/IoT SOC is an outsourced security operations centre that monitors operational technology and connected devices around the clock — industrial control systems, SCADA, building management and IoT estates — rather than only the corporate IT network. Monitoring is passive and agentless, detection is tuned to industrial protocols rather than generic IT signatures, and investigation and response are carried by analysts with genuine OT and ICS experience.
Will monitoring disrupt our production systems?
No. Monitoring is passive, non-intrusive and agentless: it observes a copy of network traffic without interacting with production systems. Nothing is installed on a controller, no packets are injected and no configuration is changed on operational equipment, so there is no mechanism by which the monitoring can alter process timing or take a system offline.
How is an OT SOC different from an IT SOC?
The priorities are inverted. An IT SOC optimises for confidentiality, where the worst outcome is data loss. An OT SOC optimises for operational continuity and physical safety, where the worst outcome is a process stopping or behaving unsafely — which means a security control that causes an outage has itself become the incident. That changes the tooling, the change windows, the escalation path and who is qualified to work an alert.
Which industrial protocols do you support?
Detection is tuned to industrial protocols including BACnet, Modbus, DNP3 and EtherNet/IP, rather than generic IT signatures applied to operational traffic. If you are running something outside that list, tell us what it is during scoping and we will tell you plainly whether we can monitor it well.
Do we have to replace our existing OT security platform?
No. We monitor Armis, Claroty, Forescout, Microsoft Defender for IoT and Nozomi Networks, and we treat them as equals — the security expertise that makes monitoring useful sits with our analysts rather than with any one platform. Where a sensor is already deployed the service works with it. Where nothing is deployed yet, the assessment comes first so the platform decision is made with evidence rather than ahead of it, and we would point you at Nozomi Networks or Microsoft Defender for IoT.
Why does the Purdue Model matter?
Because it describes how OT networks are actually layered, and threats move between those layers. Segmentation-aware monitoring gives visibility at enterprise IT, at the OT control layer and at field devices, and understands that traffic which is normal at one level is not necessarily normal at another. Monitoring that ignores the model has to bridge the boundaries to work, which undermines the segmentation you were assessed on.
Can you monitor IT and OT together?
Yes, and that is the point of running it as one service. Most attacks that reach operational technology arrive through the corporate network, so IT and OT signals are correlated in a single operation. Lateral movement between the two reads as one chain of events rather than two unrelated alerts in two consoles worked by two teams.
How long does deployment take?
Engagements begin with a scoping and discovery phase to map the OT and IoT estate, agree the monitoring architecture and define the response playbooks. Active monitoring typically begins within a few weeks of engagement start, with the exact timeline depending on the complexity of the environment and the number of sites in scope.
Does this help with NIS2 and IEC 62443?
Yes. Reporting is built to produce the evidence an assessor asks for rather than a data export you then have to interpret, covering IEC 62443 for industrial control systems and NIS2 for operators in scope. Buyers in this space generally arrive through a compliance obligation rather than a threat, so the framework is usually where the conversation starts.
We already have an internal team. Can this be co-managed?
Yes. Co-managed delivery is available where you have internal capability you want to keep using. The split of responsibilities — what we work, what you work, and where the handover sits — is agreed during scoping rather than assumed.
Start with what is
actually on the network.
Every engagement opens with scoping and discovery rather than a deployment. We map the estate as it is, agree the monitoring architecture with you in writing, and only then put anything in place.
